# **Overview of My Recent Research**

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# Areas of Recent Focus

- Probabilistic Physics of failure (PHM, ADT, ALT)
  - Fatigue
  - Creep
  - Corrosion
  - Combinations
- PPoF Based Modeling of Structures and Systems
  - Agent-Based Computing
  - Simulations-Based Computing
  - Common Cause Failures
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Reliability Analysis
  - More than 20 PRAs of Nuclear Plants
  - PRAs in Transportation (CNGs and Pipelines)
  - PRA of Small Modular Reactors
  - Failure Data Collection and Analysis
  - Modeling complex components (Compressors, pumps, MOVs, etc.)



#### Probabilistic Modeling of Failure Mechanisms

DEPARTMENT OF

MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

THE CENTER FOR RISK AND RELIABILITY

#### MTS Uniaxial Fatigue Testing Machines

- Two-post and Four-post machines rating at ±100kN in tension or compression under static and cyclic conditions.
- Fatigue Life Assessment Based on Energy Release
- Fatigue Crack Initiation Based on Entropy Generation

#### Optical Microscopy for Short Fatigue Crack

- 25 to 10X Microscope with C-mount adaptor for the video port. Magnification of 25X to 100X, can be increased to as high as 200X. Simultaneous visual and video viewing.
- Short crack detection in fatigue
- Visualization of crack growth

#### Acoustic Emission Technique for Crack Initiation and Growth

- Sensors and amplifiers to collect and amplify the signals, a data acquisition module to perform front-end filtration and record the signals, and a software module to visualize the data and to perform the required analysis such as feature extraction and source location.
- Assessment of crack initiation
- Large crack growth modeling
- Information entropy analysis of AE signals for crack initiation

#### Heating Chamber for Creep Testing

- Exposure of specimen under controlled heat up to 700°C
- Probabilistic modeling of creep
- Fatigue-creep testing capability

#### Corrosive Medium Chamber

- Probabilistic corrosion-Fatigue model development in piping
- Probabilistic pitting corrosion in pipes
- Probabilistic stress corrosion in piping

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## **Probability-Based Life Tracking**

## Interpreting FLE in terms of Probability of a > 0.01 inches Note: 0.01 inches=0.25 mm << a<sub>critical</sub>

 $a_{\text{Residual Strength}}$  is that crack size at which application of the

design limit load (DLL) will cause unstable cracking



**Challenge: Quantify the probability of exceeding residual strength** 

## **Probability-Based Life Tracking – Bayesian Approach**



## **Probability-Based Life Tracking – Bayesian Approach**

## Model Application (Loads only model!) The critical problem remaining is the rogue flaw probability

To mitigate the risk of the rogue flaw a sensor suite and/or an inspection schedule would provide the feedback. Ideally a sensor would detect some minimum threshold value with a virtual POD of 100%. Also the threshold must be less than the maximum risk taking crack  $a_{SL}$ .

![](_page_5_Figure_3.jpeg)

## Bayesian Approach Results Based on Example Aircraft Data

![](_page_6_Figure_1.jpeg)

## Quantifying Crack Size via Information Entropy

![](_page_7_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_7_Picture_2.jpeg)

![](_page_7_Figure_3.jpeg)

## Quantifying Crack Size via Information Entropy

![](_page_8_Figure_1.jpeg)

Qi, G., et al., Journal of Materials Science: Materials in Medicine, 23 (2012) 217-228. COPYRIGHT © 2014, M. Modarres

## Quantifying Crack Size via Information Entropy

![](_page_9_Figure_1.jpeg)

Normalized entropy (Normalized count)

#### **Research questions:**

- 1) What is the advantage of a signal's entropy over the conventional AE hit method for structural health monitoring?
- 2) Is there a link between info. entropy and the thermo. entropy?

M. Rabiei, M. Modarres, Quantitative methods for structural health management using in situ acoustic emission monitoring", International Journal of Fatigue, Vol. 49, April 2013, pp 81-89.

# **Multiplicative Error Model**

![](_page_10_Figure_1.jpeg)

**Result of Experiment**, X<sub>e</sub>

$$\frac{X_i}{X_{e,i}} = F_{e,i} \quad ; \quad F_e \sim LN(b_e, \sigma_e)$$
$$\frac{X_i}{X_{m,i}} = F_{m,i} \quad ; \quad F_m \sim LN(b_m, \sigma_m)$$

where:

X: Real Quantity

 $X_e$ : Result of experiment

 $X_m$ : Model prediction

 $F_e$ : The error factor for experimental data

- $F_m$ : The error factor for model predictions
- $b_{\scriptscriptstyle e}, \sigma_{\scriptscriptstyle e}$  : Mean and SD of experimental error factor

 $b_m, \sigma_m$ : Mean and SD of model error factor

$$\left. \begin{array}{l}
F_{e,i}X_{e,i} = F_{m,i}X_{m,i} \\
\frac{X_{e,i}}{X_{m,i}} = \frac{F_{m,i}}{F_{e,i}} = F_{t,i} \\
\text{Independency of } F_m, F_e
\end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow F_t \sim LN\left(b_m - b_e, \sqrt{\sigma_m^2 + \sigma_e^2}\right)$$

# Multiplicative Error: Bayesian $f(b_{m},\sigma_{m} | X_{e,i}, X_{m,i}, b_{e}, \sigma_{e}) = \frac{f_{0}(b_{m},\sigma_{m}) \times L(X_{e,i}, X_{m,i}, b_{e}, \sigma_{e} | b_{m}, \sigma_{m})}{\int_{\sigma_{m}} \int_{\sigma_{m}} \int_{\sigma_{m}$

where:

$$L(X_{e,i}, X_{m,i}, b_e, \sigma_e \mid b_m, \sigma_m) = \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} \left(\frac{X_{e,i}}{X_{m,i}}\right) \sqrt{\sigma_m^2 + \sigma_e^2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{\left[\ln\left(\frac{X_{e,i}}{X_{m,i}}\right) - (b_m - b_e)\right]^2}{\sigma_m^2 + \sigma_e^2}}$$

 $f_0(b_m, \sigma_m)$ : Prior Joint Distirbution of Parameters  $f(b_m, \sigma_m | X_{e,i}, X_{m,i}, b_e, \sigma_e)$ : Posterior Joint Distirbution of Parameters

Given a model prediction such as  $X_m$  the distribution of X will be estimated as following:

$$X_{m} \text{ given as model prediction} F_{m} \sim LN(b_{m}, \sigma_{m}) X = F_{m}X_{m}$$
$$\Rightarrow X \sim LN(\ln(X_{m}) + b_{m}, \sigma_{m})$$

## Example – FIVE Radiant Heat Flux Bayesian Approach

![](_page_12_Figure_1.jpeg)

Table I. Summary Statistics of Parameters				
Parameter	Mean	STD	2.5%	97.5%
bm	-0.1052	1.87E-02	-0.1422	-6.78E-02
Sm	5.72E-02	2.40E-02	8.62E-03	0.1049
Fm	0.902	5.90E-02	0.7885	1.03

![](_page_13_Figure_1.jpeg)

# **GP** Regression

 It is a nonlinear regression when you need to learn a function *f* with uncertainties from data *D* = {X, y}

![](_page_14_Figure_2.jpeg)

#### Ref: Eurandom 2010, Z. Ghahramani

# **Predicted Result**

![](_page_15_Figure_1.jpeg)

\*\*Dashed lines indicate 95% probability interval

# Anomaly Detection Example

![](_page_16_Figure_1.jpeg)

\*\*Dashed lines indicate 95% probability interval COPYRIGH

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# **Characteristics of AE Signal**

- Counts: the number of times that the AE signal amplitude exceeds a predefined subjective threshold value
- Peak Amplitude: related to the intensity of the source in the material producing AE signal
- Rise Time: the time it takes to reach the peak amplitude of an event

![](_page_17_Figure_4.jpeg)

![](_page_17_Picture_5.jpeg)

- Specimen:Compact Tension(CT)
- Material: Al7075-T6 aluminium alloy
- Thickness:
   3.175 mm
   (0.125 in.)

SHIVERSI

18

![](_page_18_Figure_3.jpeg)

All dimensions are in inches.

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## Experimental set up

- Optical microscopy was used as a crack size measurement tool in conjunction with AE sensor
- Time-lapse photography was performed using a digital camera
- Three fatigue tests were performed under uniform cyclic loading : (CT1, CT2, CT3)
- minimum load ~ 4.5 kN
- maximum loads ~ 9 kN
- frequency ~ 20 Hz
- loading ratio ~ 0.5.

![](_page_19_Picture_8.jpeg)

![](_page_19_Picture_9.jpeg)

**AE Sensor** 

INSTRON

Microscope

mera

## Play the movie

![](_page_20_Picture_1.jpeg)

# **Oil Pipeline PHM**

- Corrosion is considered a significant factor in the failure and damage of metals
- Annual direct cost of corrosion in U.S. oil and petrochemical industry= \$6.8 billion
- Mechanistic loads increase damage in the presence of Corrosion
- Pipelines are subject to mechanical stresses and hars corrosive environments

![](_page_21_Figure_5.jpeg)

# Oil Pipeline PHM (Cont.)

- The 2010 Enbridge Spill in Michigan-U.S. was due to Corrosion-Fatigue (~\$1B cost of clean up so far!).
- Why Mechanistic Failures are Important?
  - Preexisting cracks (pits, dents, weld flaws, cracks initiation due SCC, etc.)
  - Mechanical loads (tensile and cyclic)

![](_page_22_Figure_5.jpeg)

CORROSION EXCAVATION DAMAGE INCORRECT OPERATION MAT'L/WELD/EQUIP FAILURE NATURAL FORCE DAMAGE OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE ALL OTHER CAUSES

![](_page_22_Picture_7.jpeg)

Source: PHMSA Significant Incidents Files, December 31, 2012

Significant Incident Cause Breakdown National, Hazardous Liquid, 1992-2011

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# Approach

## • Define Conditions:

- Understand ADNOC needs and interests in the area of pipeline integrity management
- Define test conditions that matches Abu Dhabi environment and ADNOC fields
- Perform Experiments and Data Generation:
  - Experiments (involving H2S/CO2) on representative carbon steel samples
  - Analysis of data and associated uncertainties
  - Develop Lab Facilities at the Petroleum Institute for future ADNOC befits
- Develop Models:
  - Mathematical Model Development
  - Model Validation

# Steps 1 & 2 Part of Thrust II, Step 3 Part of Thrust 3.

![](_page_23_Figure_12.jpeg)

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# Problem Definition: Step 1

- A discussions with ADCO engineers and management will lead to a better definition of the problem and the required testing conditions.
- Understand:
  - Pipelines H<sub>2</sub>S/CO<sub>2</sub> conditions
  - Physical loads, residual stresses, external loads
  - Temperature, pH, stress concentrations, weld flaws

![](_page_24_Figure_6.jpeg)

# Experimental Work: Step 2

- Dog-Bone samples, API-5L grade B, will be subjected to various cyclic stresses under H<sub>2</sub>S/H<sub>2</sub>S simulated environments
- Indentations to simulate crack initiation
- study crack propagation and behavior of neighboring cracks on crack growth
- Fractography testing to understand crack growth and coalescence
- Experimental work will be done on 2 phases:
  - Phase 1: a dry test at UMD labs to define the material properties and fatigue characteristics
  - Phase 2: Corrosion testing at Honeywell lab to define the environmental factors effect on material failure

![](_page_25_Picture_8.jpeg)

# **Testing Facilities**

- Preliminary Testing:
  - Calibrating tests at UMD labs
- Fundamental Testing:
  - Honeywell Corrosion Lab, Houston, Texas, US
  - The capability allows all different types of testing:
    - Capability to handle 100% H2S and 100% CO2 , no ppm limit.
    - Capability to simulate pressures of up to 10000 psi and temperatures up to 1000 F
  - Leaders in building corrosion research labs
  - Honeywell link allows transfer of corrosion / cracking testing capability under (H<sub>2</sub>S/Co<sub>2</sub>)
- Petroleum Institute testing:
  - Restart and revive the CORETEST autoclave
  - CO<sub>2</sub> testing

![](_page_26_Picture_13.jpeg)

Honeywell

![](_page_26_Picture_15.jpeg)

# Safety Features on NuScale

#### Natural Convection for Cooling

- Inherently safe natural circulation of water over the fuel driven by gravity
- No pumps, no need for emergency generators
- Seismically Robust
  - System is submerged in a pool of water below ground in an earthquake resistant building
  - Reactor pool attenuates ground motion and dissipates energy
- Simple and Small
  - Reactor is 1/20<sup>th</sup> the size of large reactors
  - Integrated reactor design, no large-break lossof-coolant accidents
- Defense-in-Depth
  - Multiple additional barriers to protect against the release of radiation to the environment

#### 45 MWe Reactor Module

![](_page_27_Picture_13.jpeg)

# SMR PRA Modeling Considerations/ Complexities

- Integrated Design
  - ➢ Integrated Steam Generator / Health Management
  - ➢ Integrated Control Rod Drive Mechanism
  - ➢Integrated RCP
  - New Containment-RCS Interactions
  - Integrated Pressurizer
- Passive systems
  - ➢Operability / conditions of operation
  - ➤ Failure modes
  - ➤Thermal/mechanical failure mechanisms (e.g., PTS)
  - Long-term component/structure degradation

SMR PRA Modeling Considerations/ Complexities (Cont.)

- Multi-Module Risk
  - Direct Dependencies
    - ♦Common initiating events / shared SSCs
    - ♦Shared instrumentation, control, fiber optics, other cables, electric divisions
    - ♦Shared systems (e.g., FPS)
    - ♦ Capacity of shared equipment (e.g., batteries)

# Need for Failure Data

- Lack of data on equipment failure
  - Smaller units, less stress
  - Submerged units
- Initiating event frequencies (are legacy data applicable? What about new initiators?)
  - Internal
  - Integrated components
  - External